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Abstract
How could we solve the machine learning and the artificial intelligence
problem if we had infinite computation? Solomonoff induction and the
reinforcement learning agent AIXI are proposed answers to this question.
Both are known to be incomputable. In this paper, we quantify this
using the arithmetical hierarchy, and prove upper and corresponding lower
bounds for incomputability. We show that AIXI is not limit computable,
thus it cannot be approximated using finite computation. Our main result
is a limit-computable ε-optimal version of AIXI with infinite horizon that
maximizes expected rewards.
Keywords. AIXI, Solomonoff induction, general reinforcement learning, com-
putability, complexity, arithmetical hierarchy, universal Turing machine.
1 Introduction
Given infinite computation power, many traditional AI problems become trivial:
playing chess, go, or backgammon can be solved by exhaustive expansion of the
game tree. Yet other problems seem difficult still; for example, predicting the
stock market, driving a car, or babysitting your nephew. How can we solve
these problems in theory? A proposed answer to this question is the agent
AIXI [Hut00, Hut05]. As a reinforcement learning agent, its goal is to maximize
cumulative (discounted) rewards obtained from the environment [SB98].
The basis of AIXI is Solomonoff’s theory of learning [Sol64, Sol78, LV08], also
called Solomonoff induction. It arguably solves the induction problem [RH11]:
for data drawn from a computable measure µ, Solomonoff induction will con-
verge to the correct belief about any hypothesis [BD62, RH11]. Moreover, con-
vergence is extremely fast in the sense that Solomonoff induction will make a
total of at most E+O(
√
E) errors when predicting the next data points, where
E is the number of errors of the informed predictor that knows µ [Hut01]. While
learning the environment according to Solomonoff’s theory, AIXI selects actions
by running an expectimax-search for maximum cumulative discounted rewards.
It is clear that AIXI can only serve as an ideal, yet recently it has inspired some
impressive applications [VNH+11].
Both Solomonoff induction and AIXI are known to be incomputable. But
not all incomputabilities are equal. The arithmetical hierarchy specifies different
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levels of computability based on oracle machines : each level in the arithmetical
hierarchy is computed by a Turing machine which may query a halting oracle
for the respective lower level.
We posit that any ideal for a ‘perfect agent’ needs to be limit computable
(∆02). The class of limit computable functions is the class of functions that
admit an anytime algorithm. It is the highest level of the arithmetical hierarchy
which can be approximated using a regular Turing machine. If this criterion is
not met, our model would be useless to guide practical research.
For MDPs, planning is already P-complete for finite and infinite horizons
[PT87]. In POMDPs, planning is undecidable [MHC99, MHC03]. The exis-
tence of a policy whose expected value exceeds a given threshold is PSPACE-
complete [MGLA00], even for purely epistemic POMDPs in which actions do
not change the hidden state [SLR07]. In this paper we derive hardness results
for planning in general semicomputable environments; this environment class is
even more general than POMDPs. We show that finding an optimal policy is
Π02-hard and finding an ε-optimal policy is undecidable.
Moreover, we show that by default, AIXI is not limit computable. The
reason is twofold: First, when picking the next action, two or more actions
might have the same value (expected future rewards). The choice between them
is easy, but determining whether such a tie exists is difficult. Second, in case
of an infinite horizon (using discounting), the iterative definition of the value
function [Hut05, Def. 5.30] conditions on surviving forever. The first problem
can be circumvented by settling for an ε-optimal agent. We show that the second
problem can be solved by using the recursive instead of the iterative definition
of the value function. With this we get a limit-computable agent with infinite
horizon. Table 1 and Table 3 summarize our computability results.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 The Arithmetical Hierarchy
A set A ⊆ N is Σ0n iff there is a computable relation S such that
k ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∃k1∀k2 . . .Qnkn S(k, k1, . . . , kn) (1)
where Qn = ∀ if n is even, Qn = ∃ if n is odd [Nie09, Def. 1.4.10]. A set A ⊆ N
is Π0n iff its complement N\A is Σ0n. We call the formula on the right hand side
of (1) a Σ0n-formula, its negation is called Π
0
n-formula. It can be shown that
we can add any bounded quantifiers and duplicate quantifiers of the same type
without changing the classification of A. The set A is ∆0n iff A is Σ
0
n and A is
Π0n. We get that Σ
0
1 as the class of recursively enumerable sets, Π
0
1 as the class
of co-recursively enumerable sets and ∆01 as the class of recursive sets.
We say the set A ⊆ N is Σ0n-hard (Π0n-hard, ∆0n-hard) iff for any set B ∈ Σ0n
(B ∈ Π0n, B ∈ ∆0n), B is many-one reducible to A, i.e., there is a computable
function f such that k ∈ B ↔ f(k) ∈ A [Nie09, Def. 1.2.1]. We get Σ0n ⊂
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Model γ Optimal ε-Optimal
Iterative AINU
DC ∆04, Σ
0
3-hard ∆
0
3, Π
0
2-hard
LT ∆03, Π
0
2-hard ∆
0
2, Σ
0
1-hard
Iterative AIXI
DC ∆04, Π
0
2-hard ∆
0
3, Π
0
2-hard
LT ∆03, Σ
0
1-hard ∆
0
2, Σ
0
1-hard
Iterative AIMU
DC ∆02 ∆
0
1
LT ∆02 ∆
0
1
Recursive AINU
DC ∆03, Π
0
2-hard ∆
0
2, Σ
0
1-hard
LT ∆03, Π
0
2-hard ∆
0
2, Σ
0
1-hard
Recursive AIXI
DC ∆03, Σ
0
1-hard ∆
0
2, Σ
0
1-hard
LT ∆03, Σ
0
1-hard ∆
0
2, Σ
0
1-hard
Recursive AIMU
DC ∆02 ∆
0
1
LT ∆02 ∆
0
1
Table 1: Computability results for different agent models derived in Section 3.
DC means general discounting, a lower semicomputable discount function γ; LT
means finite lifetime, undiscounted rewards up to a fixed lifetime m. Hardness
results for AIXI are with respect to a specific universal Turing machine; hardness
results for AINU are with respect to a specific environment ν ∈M.
∆0n+1 ⊂ Σ0n+1 ⊂ . . . and Π0n ⊂ ∆0n+1 ⊂ Π0n+1 ⊂ . . .. This hierarchy of subsets
of natural numbers is known as the arithmetical hierarchy.
By Post’s Theorem [Nie09, Thm. 1.4.13], a set is Σ0n if and only if it is
recursively enumerable on an oracle machine with an oracle for a Σ0n−1-complete
set.
2.2 Strings
Let X be some finite set called alphabet. The set X ∗ := ⋃∞n=0 Xn is the set of
all finite strings over the alphabet X , the set X∞ is the set of all infinite strings
over the alphabet X , and the set X ♯ := X ∗ ∪ X∞ is their union. The empty
string is denoted by ǫ, not to be confused with the small positive real number
ε. Given a string x ∈ X ∗, we denote its length by |x|. For a (finite or infinite)
string x of length ≥ k, we denote with x1:k the first k characters of x, and with
x<k the first k − 1 characters of x. The notation x1:∞ stresses that x is an
infinite string. We write x ⊑ y iff x is a prefix of y, i.e., x = y1:|x|.
2.3 Computability of Real-valued Functions
We fix some encoding of rational numbers into binary strings and an encoding
of binary strings into natural numbers. From now on, this encoding will be done
implicitly wherever necessary.
3
f> f<
f is computable ∆01 ∆
0
1
f is lower semicomputable Σ01 Π
0
1
f is upper semicomputable Π01 Σ
0
1
f is limit computable ∆02 ∆
0
2
f is ∆0n-computable ∆
0
n ∆
0
n
f is Σ0n-computable Σ
0
n Π
0
n
f is Π0n-computable Π
0
n Σ
0
n
Table 2: Connection between the computability of real-valued functions and
the arithmetical hierarchy. We use the shorthand f> := {(x, q) | f(x) > q} and
f< := {(x, q) | f(x) < q}.
Definition 1 (Σ0n-, Π
0
n-, ∆
0
n-computable). A function f : X ∗ → R is called
Σ0n-computable (Π
0
n-computable, ∆
0
n-computable) iff the set {(x, q) ∈ X ∗ × Q |
f(x) > q} is Σ0n (Π0n, ∆0n).
A ∆01-computable function is called computable, a Σ
0
1-computable function
is called lower semicomputable, and a Π01-computable function is called upper
semicomputable. A ∆02-computable function f is called limit computable, be-
cause there is a computable function φ such that
lim
k→∞
φ(x, k) = f(x).
The program φ that limit computes f can be thought of as an anytime algorithm
for f : we can stop φ at any time k and get a preliminary answer. If the program
φ ran long enough (which we do not know), this preliminary answer will be close
to the correct one.
Limit-computable sets are the highest level in the arithmetical hierarchy that
can be approached by a regular Turing machine. Above limit-computable sets
we necessarily need some form of halting oracle. See Table 2 for the definition
of lower/upper semicomputable and limit-computable functions in terms of the
arithmetical hierarchy.
Lemma 2 (Computability of Arithmetical Operations). Let n > 0 and let
f, g : X ∗ → R be two ∆0n-computable functions. Then
(i) {(x, y) | f(x) > g(y)} is Σ0n,
(ii) {(x, y) | f(x) ≤ g(y)} is Π0n,
(iii) f + g, f − g, and f · g are ∆0n-computable, and
(iv) f/g is ∆0n-computable if g(x) 6= 0 for all x.
4
2.4 Algorithmic Information Theory
A semimeasure over the alphabet X is a function ν : X ∗ → [0, 1] such that
(i) ν(ǫ) ≤ 1, and (ii) ν(x) ≥∑a∈X ν(xa) for all x ∈ X ∗. A semimeasure is called
(probability) measure iff for all x equalities hold in (i) and (ii). Solomonoff’s
prior M [Sol64] assigns to a string x the probability that the reference universal
monotone Turing machine U [LV08, Ch. 4.5.2] computes a string starting with x
when fed with uniformly random bits as input. The measure mixture M [Ga´83,
p. 74] removes the contribution of programs that do not compute infinite strings;
it is a measure except for a constant factor. Formally,
M(x) :=
∑
p:x⊑U(p)
2−|p|, M(x) := lim
n→∞
∑
y∈Xn
M(xy)
Equivalently, the Solomonoff prior M can be defined as a mixture over all lower
semicomputable semimeasures [WSH11]. The function M is a lower semicom-
putable semimeasure, but not computable and not a measure [LV08, Lem. 4.5.3].
A semimeasure ν can be turned into a measure νnorm using Solomonoff normal-
ization: νnorm(ǫ) := 1 and for all x ∈ X ∗ and a ∈ X ,
νnorm(xa) := νnorm(x)
ν(xa)∑
b∈X ν(xb)
. (2)
2.5 General Reinforcement Learning
In general reinforcement learning the agent interacts with an environment in
cycles: at time step t the agent chooses an action at ∈ A and receives a percept
et = (ot, rt) ∈ E consisting of an observation ot ∈ O and a real-valued reward
rt ∈ R; the cycle then repeats for t + 1. A history is an element of (A × E)∗.
We use æ ∈ A×E to denote one interaction cycle, and æ1:t to denote a history
of length t. The goal in reinforcement learning is to maximize total discounted
rewards. A policy is a function π : (A × E)∗ → A mapping each history to the
action taken after seeing this history.
The environment can be stochastic, but is assumed to be semicomputable.
In accordance with the AIXI literature [Hut05], we model environments as lower
semicomputable chronological conditional semimeasures (LSCCCSs). A condi-
tional semimeasure ν takes a sequence of actions a1:∞ as input and returns a
semimeasure ν( · ‖ a1:∞) over E♯. A conditional semimeasure ν is chronological
iff percepts at time t do not depend on future actions, i.e., ν(e1:t ‖ a1:∞) =
ν(e1:t ‖ a′1:∞) whenever a1:t = a′1:t. Therefore we can write ν(e1:t ‖ a1:t) instead
of ν(e1:t ‖ a1:∞). Despite their name, conditional semimeasures do not specify
conditional probabilities; the environment ν is not a joint probability distribu-
tion on actions and percepts. Here we only care about the computability of the
environment ν; for our purposes, chronological conditional semimeasures behave
just like semimeasures.
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2.6 The Universal Agent AIXI
Our environment class M is the class of all LSCCCSs. Typically, Bayesian
agents such as AIXI only function well if the true environment is in their hy-
pothesis class. Since the hypothesis classM is extremely large, the assumption
that it contains the true environment is rather weak. We fix the universal prior
(wν)ν∈M with wν > 0 for all ν ∈ M and
∑
ν∈M wν ≤ 1, given by the reference
machine U . The universal prior w gives rise to the universal mixture ξ, which
is a convex combination of all LSCCCSs M:
ξ(e<t ‖ a<t) :=
∑
ν∈M
wνν(e<t ‖ a<t)
It is analogous to the Solomonoff priorM but defined for reactive environments.
Like M , the universal mixture ξ is lower semicomputable [Hut05, Sec. 5.10].
We fix a discount function γ : N → R with γt := γ(t) ≥ 0 and
∑∞
t=1 γt <∞
and make the following assumptions.
Assumption 3. (a) The discount function γ is lower semicomputable.
(b) Rewards are bounded between 0 and 1.
(c) The set of actions A and the set of percepts E are both finite.
Assumption 3 (b) could be relaxed to bounded rewards because we can
rescale rewards r 7→ cr + d for any c, d ∈ R without changing optimal poli-
cies if the environment ν is a measure. However, for our value-related results,
we require that rewards are nonnegative.
We define the discount normalization factor Γt :=
∑∞
i=t γi. There is no
requirement that Γt > 0. In fact, we use γ for both, AIXI with discounted
infinite horizon (Γt > 0 for all t), and AIXI with finite lifetime m. In the latter
case we set
γLTm(t) :=
{
1 if t ≤ m
0 if t > m.
If we knew the true environment ν ∈ M, we would choose the ν-optimal
agent known as AINU that maximizes ν-expected value (if ν is a measure).
Since we do not know the true environment, we use the universal mixture ξ over
all environments in M instead. This yields the Bayesian agent AIXI: it weighs
every environment ν ∈M according to its prior probability wν .
Definition 4 (Iterative Value Function [Hut05, Def. 5.30]). The value of a
policy π in an environment ν given history æ<t is
V πν (æ<t) :=
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
∑
et:m
R(et:m)ν(e1:m | e<t ‖ a1:m)
if Γt > 0 and V
π
ν (æ<t) := 0 if Γt = 0 where ai := π(e<i) for all i ≥ t and
R(et:m) :=
∑m
k=t γkrk. The optimal value is defined as V
∗
ν (h) := supπ V
π
ν (h).
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Let æ<t ∈ (A × E)∗ be some history. We extend the value functions V πν to
include initial interactions (in reinforcement learning literature on MDPs these
are called Q-values), V πν (æ<tat) := V
π′
ν (æ<t) where π
′ is the policy π except
that it takes action at next, i.e., π
′(æ<t) := at and π
′(h) := π(h) for all h 6= æ<t.
We define V ∗ν (æ<tat) := supπ V
π
ν (æ<tat) analogously.
Definition 5 (Optimal Policy [Hut05, Def. 5.19 & 5.30]). A policy π is optimal
in environment ν (ν-optimal) iff for all histories the policy π attains the optimal
value: V πν (h) = V
∗
ν (h) for all h ∈ (A× E)∗.
Since the discount function is summable, rewards are bounded (Assumption 3b),
and actions and percepts spaces are both finite (Assumption 3c), an optimal
policy exists for every environment ν ∈ M [LH14, Thm. 10]. For a fixed envi-
ronment ν, an explicit expression for the optimal value function is
V ∗ν (æ<t) =
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
max
∑
æt:m
R(et:m)ν(e1:m | e<t ‖ a1:m), (3)
where
∑
max denotes the expectimax operator:
max
∑
æt:m
:= max
at∈A
∑
et∈E
. . . max
am∈A
∑
em∈E
For an environment ν ∈ M (an LSCCCS), AINU is defined as a ν-optimal
policy π∗ν = argmaxπ V
π
ν (ǫ). To stress that the environment is given by a
measure µ ∈M (as opposed to a semimeasure), we use AIMU. AIXI is defined
as a ξ-optimal policy π∗ξ for the universal mixture ξ [Hut05, Ch. 5]. Since ξ ∈M
and every measure µ ∈ M is also a semimeasure, both AIMU and AIXI are a
special case of AINU. However, AIXI is not a special case of AIMU since the
mixture ξ is not a measure.
Because there can be more than one optimal policy, the definitions of AINU,
AIMU and AIXI are not unique. More specifically, a ν-optimal policy maps a
history h to
π∗ν(h) :∈ argmax
a∈A
V ∗ν (ha). (4)
If there are multiple actions α, β ∈ A that attain the optimal value, V ∗ν (hα) =
V ∗ν (hβ), we say there is an argmax tie. Which action we settle on in case of a
tie (how we break the tie) is irrelevant and can be arbitrary.
3 The Complexity of AINU, AIMU, and AIXI
3.1 The Complexity of Solomonoff Induction
AIXI uses an analogue to Solomonoff’s prior on all possible environments M.
Therefore we first state computability results for Solomonoff’s prior M and the
measure mixture M in Table 3 [LH15b]. Notably, M is lower semicomputable
and its conditional is limit computable. However, neither the measure mixture
M nor any of its variants are limit computable.
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Plain Conditional
M Σ01 \∆01 ∆02 \ (Σ01 ∪Π01)
Mnorm ∆
0
2 \ (Σ01 ∪ Π01) ∆02 \ (Σ01 ∪Π01)
M Π02 \∆02 ∆03 \ (Σ02 ∪Π02)
Mnorm ∆
0
3 \ (Σ02 ∪ Π02) ∆03 \ (Σ02 ∪Π02)
Table 3: The complexity of the set {(x, q) ∈ X ∗ × Q | f(x) > q} where
f ∈ {M,Mnorm,M,Mnorm} is one of the various versions of Solomonoff’s prior.
Lower bounds on the complexity ofM andMnorm hold only for specific universal
Turing machines.
3.2 Upper Bounds
In this section, we derive upper bounds on the computability of AINU, AIMU,
and AIXI. Except for Corollary 13, all results in this section apply generally to
any LSCCCS ν ∈ M, hence they apply to AIXI even though they are stated
for AINU.
For a fixed lifetime m, only the first m interactions matter. There is a finite
number of policies that are different for the firstm interactions, and the optimal
policy π∗ξ can be encoded in a finite number of bits and is thus computable. To
make a meaningful statement about the computability of AINULT, we have to
consider it as the function that takes the lifetime m and outputs a policy π∗ξ that
is optimal in the environment ξ using the discount function γLTm. In contrast,
for infinite lifetime discounting we just consider the function π∗ξ : (A×E)∗ → A.
In order to position AINU in the arithmetical hierarchy, we need to identify
these functions with sets of natural numbers. In both cases, finite and infinite
lifetime, we represent these functions as relations over N × (A × E)∗ × A and
(A × E)∗ × A respectively. These relations are easily identified with sets of
natural numbers by encoding the tuple with their arguments into one natural
number. From now on this translation of policies (and m) into sets of natural
numbers will be done implicitly wherever necessary.
Lemma 6 (Policies are in ∆0n). If a policy π is Σ
0
n or Π
0
n, then π is ∆
0
n.
Proof. Let ϕ be a Σ0n-formula (Π
0
n-formula) defining π, i.e., ϕ(h, a) holds iff
π(h) = a. We define the formula ϕ′,
ϕ′(h, a) :=
∧
a′∈A\{a}
¬ϕ(h, a′).
The set of actions A is finite, hence ϕ′ is a Π0n-formula (Σ0n-formula). Moreover,
ϕ′ is equivalent to ϕ.
To compute the optimal policy, we need to compute the value function.
The following lemma gives an upper bound on the computability of the value
function for environments in M.
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Lemma 7 (Complexity of V ∗ν ). For every LSCCCS ν ∈ M, the function V ∗ν is
Π02-computable. For γ = γLTm the function V
∗
ν is ∆
0
2-computable.
Proof. Multiplying (3) with Γtν(e<t ‖ a<t) yields V ∗ν (æ<t) > q if and only if
lim
m→∞
max
∑
æt:m
ν(e1:m ‖ a1:m)R(et:m) > q Γt ν(e<t ‖ a<t). (5)
The inequality’s right side is lower semicomputable, hence there is a computable
function ψ such that ψ(ℓ) ր q Γt ν(e<t ‖ a<t) =: q′ for ℓ → ∞. For a fixed
m, the left side is also lower semicomputable, therefore there is a computable
function φ such that φ(m, k) ր ∑maxæt:mν(e1:m ‖ a1:m)R(et:m) =: f(m) for
k →∞. We already know that the limit of f(m) for m→∞ exists (uniquely),
hence we can write (5) as
lim
m→∞
f(m) > q′
⇐⇒ ∀m0 ∃m ≥ m0. f(m) > q′
⇐⇒ ∀m0 ∃m ≥ m0 ∃k. φ(m, k) > q′
⇐⇒ ∀ℓ ∀m0 ∃m ≥ m0 ∃k. φ(m, k) > ψ(ℓ),
which is a Π02-formula. In the finite lifetime case wherem is fixed, the value func-
tion V ∗ν (æ<t) is ∆
0
2-computable by Lemma 2 (iv), since V
∗
ν (æ<t) = f(m)q/q
′.
From the optimal value function V ∗ν we get the optimal policy π
∗
ν according
to (4). However, in cases where there is more than one optimal action, we have
to break an argmax tie. This happens iff V ∗ν (hα) = V
∗
ν (hβ) for two potential
actions α 6= β ∈ A. This equality test is more difficult than determining which
is larger in cases where they are unequal. Thus we get the following upper
bound.
Theorem 8 (Complexity of Optimal Policies). For any environment ν ∈ M,
if V ∗ν is ∆
0
n-computable, then there is an optimal policy π
∗
ν for the environment
ν that is ∆0n+1.
Proof. To break potential ties, we pick an (arbitrary) total order ≻ on A that
specifies which actions should be preferred in case of a tie. We define
πν(h) = a :⇐⇒
∧
a′:a′≻a
V ∗ν (ha) > V
∗
ν (ha
′)
∧
∧
a′:a≻a′
V ∗ν (ha) ≥ V ∗ν (ha′).
(6)
Then πν is a ν-optimal policy according to (4). By assumption, V
∗
ν is ∆
0
n-
computable. By Lemma 2 (i) and (ii) V ∗ν (ha) > V
∗
ν (ha
′) is in Σ0n and V
∗
ν (ha) ≥
V ∗ν (ha
′) is Π0n. Therefore the policy πν defined in (6) is a conjunction of a
Σ0n-formula and a Π
0
n-formula and thus in ∆
0
n+1.
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Corollary 9 (Complexity of AINU). AINULT is ∆
0
3 and AINUDC is ∆
0
4 for
every environment ν ∈ M.
Proof. From Lemma 7 and Theorem 8.
Usually we do not mind taking slightly suboptimal actions. Therefore ac-
tually trying to determine if two actions have the exact same value seems like
a waste of resources. In the following, we consider policies that attain a value
that is always within some ε > 0 of the optimal value.
Definition 10 (ε-Optimal Policy). A policy π is ε-optimal in environment ν
iff V ∗ν (h)− V πν (h) < ε for all histories h ∈ (A× E)∗.
Theorem 11 (Complexity of ε-Optimal Policies). For any environment ν ∈ M,
if V ∗ν is ∆
0
n-computable, then there is an ε-optimal policy π
ε
ν for the environment
ν that is ∆0n.
Proof. Let ε > 0 be given. Since the value function V ∗ν (h) is ∆
0
n-computable,
the set Vε := {(ha, q) | |q − V ∗ν (ha)| < ε/2} is in ∆0n according to Definition 1.
Hence we compute the values V ∗ν (ha
′) until we get within ε/2 for every a′ ∈ A
and then choose the action with the highest value so far. Formally, let ≻ be an
arbitrary total order on A that specifies which actions should be preferred in
case of a tie. Without loss of generality, we assume ε = 1/k, and define Q to be
an ε/2-grid on [0, 1], i.e., Q := {0, 1/2k, 2/2k, . . . , 1}. We define
πεν(h) = a :⇐⇒ ∃(qa′)a′∈A ∈ QA.
∧
a′∈A
(ha′, qa′) ∈ Vε
∧
∧
a′:a′≻a
qa > qa′ ∧
∧
a′:a≻a′
qa ≥ qa′
∧ the tuple (qa′)a′∈A is minimal with
respect to the lex. ordering on QA.
(7)
This makes the choice of a unique. Moreover, QA is finite since A is finite, and
hence (7) is a ∆0n-formula.
Corollary 12 (Complexity of ε-Optimal AINU). For any environment ν ∈ M,
there is an ε-optimal policy for AINULT that is ∆
0
2 and there is an ε-optimal
policy for AINUDC that is ∆
0
3.
Proof. From Lemma 7 and Theorem 11.
If the environment ν ∈ M is a measure, i.e., ν assigns zero probability to
finite strings, then we get computable ε-optimal policies.
Corollary 13 (Complexity of AIMU). If the environment µ ∈M is a measure
and the discount function γ is computable, then and AIMULT and AIMUDC are
limit computable (∆02), and ε-optimal AIMULT and AIMUDC are computable
(∆01).
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Proof. In the discounted case, we can truncate the limit m → ∞ in (3) at the
ε/2-effective horizon meff := min{k | Γk/Γt < ε/2}, since everything after meff
can contribute at most ε/2 to the value function. Any lower semicomputable
measure is computable [LV08, Lem. 4.5.1]. Therefore V ∗µ as given in (3) is
composed only of computable functions, hence it is computable according to
Lemma 2. The claim now follows from Theorem 8 and Theorem 11.
3.3 Lower Bounds
We proceed to show that the bounds from the previous section are the best we
can hope for. In environment classes where ties have to be broken, AIMUDC
has to solve Σ03-hard problems (Theorem 15), and AIMULT has to solve Π
0
2-
hard problems (Theorem 16). These lower bounds are stated for particular
environments ν ∈ M.
We also construct universal mixtures that yield bounds on ε-optimal policies.
In the finite lifetime case, there is an ε-optimal AIXILT that solves Σ
0
1-hard prob-
lems (Theorem 17), and for general discounting, there is an ε-optimal AIXIDC
that solves Π02-hard problems (Theorem 18). For arbitrary universal mixtures,
we prove the following weaker statement that only guarantees incomputability.
Theorem 14 (No AIXI is computable). AIXILT and AIXIDC are not com-
putable for any universal Turing machine U .
This theorem follows from the incomputability of Solomonoff induction.
Since AIXI uses an analogue of Solomonoff’s prior for learning, it succeeds
to predict the environment’s behavior for its own policy [Hut05, Thm. 5.31].
If AIXI were computable, then there would be computable environments more
powerful than AIXI: they can simulate AIXI and anticipate its prediction, which
leads to a contradiction.
Proof. Assume there is a computable policy π∗ξ that is optimal in ξ. We define a
deterministic environment µ, the adversarial environment to π∗ξ . The environ-
ment µ gives rewards 0 as long as the agent follows the policy π∗ξ , and rewards 1
once the agent deviates. Formally, we ignore observations by setting O := {0},
and define
µ(r1:t ‖ a1:t) :=


1 if ∀k ≤ t. ak = π∗ξ ((ar)<k) and rk = 0
1 if ∀k ≤ t. rk = 1k≥i
where i := min{j | aj 6= π∗ξ ((ar)<j)}
0 otherwise.
The environment µ is computable because the policy π∗ξ was assumed to be
computable. Suppose π∗ξ acts in µ, then by [Hut05, Thm. 5.36], AIXI learns to
predict perfectly on policy:
V ∗ξ (æ<t) = V
π∗ξ
ξ (æ<t)→ V
π∗ξ
µ (æ<t) = 0 as t→∞,
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since both π∗ξ and µ are deterministic. Therefore we find a t large enough such
that V ∗ξ (æ<t) < wµ (in the finite lifetime case we choose m > t) where æ<t
is the interaction history of π∗ξ in µ. A policy π with π(æ<t) 6= π∗ξ (æ<t), gets
a reward of 1 in environment µ for all time steps after t, hence V πµ (æ<t) = 1.
With linearity of V πξ (æ<t) in ξ [Hut05, Thm. 5.31],
V πξ (æ<t) ≥ wµ µ(e1:t‖a1:t)ξ(e1:t‖a1:t)V
π
µ (æ<t) ≥ wµ,
since µ(e1:t ‖ a1:t) = 1 (µ is deterministic), V πµ (æ<t) = 1, and ξ(e1:t ‖ a1:t) ≤ 1.
Now we get a contradiction:
wµ > V
∗
ξ (æ<t) = max
π′
V π
′
ξ (æ<t) ≥ V πξ (æ<t) ≥ wµ
For the remainder of this section, we fix the action space to be A := {α, β}
with action α favored in ties. The percept space is fixed to a tuple of binary
observations and rewards, E := O × {0, 1} with O := {0, 1}.
Theorem 15 (AINUDC is Σ
0
3-hard). If Γt > 0 for all t, there is an environment
ν ∈ M such that AINUDC is Σ03-hard.
Proof. Let A be any Σ03 set, then there is a computable relation S such that
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ ∃i ∀t ∃k S(n, i, t, k). (8)
We define a class of environments M′ = {ρ0, ρ1, . . .} ⊂ M where each environ-
ment ρi is defined by
ρi((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) :=


2−t, if o1:t = 1
t and ∀t′ ≤ t. rt′ = 0
2−n−1, if ∃n. 1n0 ⊑ o1:t ⊑ 1n0∞ and an+2 = α
and ∀t′ ≤ t. rt′ = 0
2−n−1, if ∃n. 1n0 ⊑ o1:t ⊑ 1n0∞ and an+2 = β
and ∀t′ ≤ t. rt′ = 1t′>n+1
and ∀t′ ≤ t ∃k S(n, i, t′, k)
0, otherwise.
Every ρi is a chronological conditional semimeasure by definition, so M′ ⊆M.
Furthermore, every ρi is lower semicomputable since S is computable.
We define our environment ν as a mixture overM′,
ν :=
∑
i∈N
2−i−1ρi;
the choice of the weights on the environments ρi is arbitrary but positive. Let
π∗ν be an optimal policy for the environment ν and recall that the action α is
preferred in ties. We claim that for the ν-optimal policy π∗ν ,
n ∈ A ⇐⇒ π∗ν(1n0) = β. (9)
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This enables us to decide whether n ∈ A given the policy π∗ν , hence proving (9)
concludes this proof.
Let n, i ∈ N be given, and suppose we are in environment i and observe 1n0.
Taking action α next yields rewards 0 forever; taking action β next yields a
reward of 1 for those time steps t ≥ n+2 for which ∀t′ ≤ t ∃k S(n, i, t′, k), after
that the semimeasure assigns probability 0 to all next observations. Therefore,
if for some t0 there is no k such that S(n, i, t0, k), then ρi(e1:t0 ‖ . . . β . . .) = 0,
and hence
V ∗ρi (1
n0β) = 0 = V ∗ρi(1
n0α),
and otherwise ρi yields reward 1 for every time step after n+ 1, therefore
V ∗ρi(1
n0β) = Γn+2 > 0 = V
∗
ρi
(1n0α)
(omitting the first n + 1 actions and rewards in the argument of the value
function). We can now show (9): By (8), n ∈ A if and only if there is an i such
that for all t there is a k such that S(n, i, t, k), which happens if and only if
there is an i ∈ N such that V ∗ρi (1n0β) > 0, which is equivalent to V ∗ν (1n0β) > 0,
which in turn is equivalent to π∗µ(1
n0) = β since V ∗ν (1
n0α) = 0 and action α is
favored in ties.
Theorem 16 (AINULT is Π
0
2-hard). There is an environment ν ∈ M such that
AINULT is Π
0
2-hard.
The proof of Theorem 16 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 15. The
notable difference is that we replace ∀t′ ≤ t ∃k S(n, i, t′, k) with ∃k S(n, i, k).
Moreover, we swap actions α and β: action α ‘checks’ the relation S and action
β gives a sure reward of 1.
Theorem 17 (Some ε-optimal AIXILT are Σ
0
1-hard). There is a universal Tur-
ing machine U ′ and an ε > 0 such that any ε-optimal policy for AIXILT is
Σ01-hard.
Proof. Let ξ denote the universal mixture derived from the reference universal
monotone Turing machine U . Let A be a Σ01-set and S computable relation
such that n+ 1 ∈ A iff ∃k S(n, k). We define the environment
ν((or)1:t ‖ a1:t) :=


ξ((or)1:n ‖ a1:n), if ∃n. o1:n = 1n−10
and an = α
and ∀t′ > n. et′ = (0, 12 )
ξ((or)1:n ‖ a1:n), if ∃n. o1:n = 1n−10
and an = β
and ∀t′ > n. et = (0, 1)
and ∃k S(n− 1, k).
ξ((or)1:t ‖ a1:t), if ∄n. o1:n = 1n−10
0, otherwise.
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The environment ν mimics the universal environment ξ until the observation
history is 1n−10. Taking the action α next gives rewards 1/2 forever. Taking
the action β next gives rewards 1 forever if n ∈ A, otherwise the environment
ν ends at some future time step. Therefore we want to take action β if and
only if n ∈ A. We have that ν is an LSCCCS since ξ is an LSCCCS and S is
computable.
We define the universal lower semicomputable semimeasure ξ′ := 12ν +
1
8ξ.
Choose ε := 1/9. Let n ∈ A be given and define the lifetime m := n + 1. Let
h ∈ (A × E)n be any history with observations o1:n = 1n−10. Since ν(1n−10 |
a1:n) = ξ(1
n−10 | a1:n) by definition, the posterior weights of ν and ξ in ξ′ are
equal to the prior weights, analogously to [LH15a, Thm. 7]. In the following,
we use the linearity of V
π∗
ξ′
ρ in ρ [Hut05, Thm. 5.21], and the fact that values
are bounded between 0 and 1. If there is a k such that S(n− 1, k),
V ∗ξ′(hβ) − V ∗ξ′(hα) = 12V
π∗
ξ′
ν (hβ)− 12V
π∗
ξ′
ν (hα) +
1
8V
π∗
ξ′
ξ (hβ)− 18V
π∗
ξ′
ξ (hα)
≥ 12 − 14 + 0− 18 = 18 ,
and similarly if there is no k such that S(n− 1, k), then
V ∗ξ′(hα) − V ∗ξ′(hβ) = 12V
π∗
ξ′
ν (hα) − 12V
π∗
ξ′
ν (hβ) +
1
8V
π∗
ξ′
ξ (hα)− 18V
π∗
ξ′
ξ (hβ)
≥ 14 − 0 + 0− 18 = 18 .
In both cases |V ∗ξ′(hβ) − V ∗ξ′ (hα)| > 1/9. Hence we pick ε := 1/9 and get for
every ε-optimal policy πεξ′ that π
ε
ξ′(h) = β if and only if n ∈ A.
Theorem 18 (Some ε-optimal AIXIDC are Π
0
2-hard). There is a universal Tur-
ing machine U ′ and an ε > 0 such that any ε-optimal policy for AIXIDC is
Π02-hard.
The proof of Theorem 18 is analogous to the proof of Theorem 17 except
that we choose ∀m′ ≤ m ∃k S(x,m, k) as a condition for reward 1 after playing
action β.
4 Iterative vs. Recursive AINU
Generally, our environment ν ∈ M is only a semimeasure and not a measure.
I.e., there is a history æ<tat such that
1 >
∑
et∈E
ν(et | e<t ‖ a1:t).
In such cases, with positive probability the environment ν does not produce a
new percept et. If this occurs, we shall use the informal interpretation that the
environment ν ended, but our formal argument does not rely on this interpre-
tation.
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The following proposition shows that for a semimeasure ν ∈ M that is
not a measure, the iterative definition of AINU does not maximize ν-expected
rewards. Recall that γ1 states the discount of the first reward. In the following,
we assume without loss of generality that γ1 > 0, i.e., we are not indifferent
about the reward received in time step 1.
Proposition 19 (Iterative AINU is not a ν-Expected Rewards Maximizer).
For any ε > 0 there is an environment ν ∈ M that is not a measure and a
policy π that receives a total of γ1 rewards in ν, but AINU receives only εγ1
rewards in ν.
Informally, the environment ν is defined as follows. In the first time step,
the agent chooses between the two actions α and β. Taking action α gives a
reward of 1, and subsequently the environment ends. Action β gives a reward
of ε, but the environment continues forever. There are no other rewards in this
environment. From the perspective of ν-expected reward maximization, it is
better to take action α, however AINU takes action β.
Proof. Let ε > 0. We ignore observations and set E := {0, ε, 1}, A := {α, β}.
The environment ν is formally defined by
ν(r1:t ‖ a1:t) :=


1 if a1 = α and r1 = 1 and t = 1
1 if a1 = β and r1 = ε and rk = 0 ∀1 < k ≤ t
0 otherwise.
Taking action α first, we have ν(r1:t ‖ αa2:t) = 0 for t > 1 (the environment ν
ends in time step 2 given history α). Hence we use (3) to conclude
V ∗ν (α) =
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
∑
r1:m
ν(r1:m ‖ αa2:m)
m∑
i=1
ri = 0.
Taking action β first we get
V ∗ν (β) =
1
Γt
lim
m→∞
∑
r1:m
ν(r1:m ‖ βa2:m)
m∑
i=1
ri =
γ1
Γ1
ε.
Since γ1 > 0 and ε > 0, we have V
∗
ν (β) > V
∗
ν (α), and thus AIMU will use a
policy that plays action β first, receiving a total discounted reward of εγ1. In
contrast, any policy π that takes action α first receives a larger total discounted
reward of γ1.
Whether it is reasonable to assume that our environment has a nonzero
probability of ending is a philosophical debate we do not want to engage in
here. Instead, we have a different motivation to use the recursive value function:
we get an improved computability result. Concretely, we show that for all
environments ν ∈ M, there is a limit-computable ε-optimal policy maximizing
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ν-expected rewards using an infinite horizon. According to Theorem 18, this
does not hold for all V ∗ν -maximizing agents AINU.
In order to maximize ν-expected rewards in case ν is not a measure, we need
the recursive definition of the value function (analogously to [Hut05, Eq. 4.12]).
To avoid confusion, we denote it Wπν :
Wπν (æ<t) =
1
Γt
∑
et
(
γtrt + Γt+1W
π
ν (æ1:t)
)
ν(et | e<t ‖ a1:t)
where at := π(æ<t). In the following we write it in non-recursive form.
Definition 20 (ν-Expected Value Function). The ν-expected value of a policy
π in an environment ν given history æ<t is
Wπν (æ<t) :=
1
Γt
∞∑
m=t
∑
et:m
γmrmν(e1:m | e<t ‖ a1:m)
if Γt > 0 and W
π
ν (æ<t) := 0 if Γt = 0 where ai := π(e<i) for all i ≥ t. The
optimal ν-expected value is defined as W ∗ν (h) := supπW
π
ν (h).
The difference between V πν and W
π
ν is that for W
π
ν all obtained rewards
matter, but for V πν only the rewards in timelines that continue indefinitely.
In this sense the value function V πν conditions on surviving forever. If the
environment µ is a measure, then the history is infinite with probability one,
and so V πν and W
π
ν coincide. Hence this distinction is not relevant for AIMU,
only for AINU and AIXI.
So why use V πν in the first place? Historically, this is how infinite-horizon
AIXI has been defined [Hut05, Def. 5.30]. This definition is the natural adapta-
tion of (optimal) minimax search in zero-sum games to the (optimal) expecti-
max algorithm for stochastic environments. It turns out to be problematic only
because semimeasures have positive probability of ending prematurely.
Lemma 21 (Complexity of W ∗ν ). For every LSCCCS ν ∈ M, and every lower
semicomputable discount function γ, the function W ∗ν is ∆
0
2-computable.
Proof. The proof is analogous to the proof of Lemma 7. We expand Definition 20
using the expectimax operator analogously to (3). This gives a quotient with
numerator
lim
m→∞
max
∑
æt:m
m∑
i=t
γiriν(e1:i ‖ a1:i),
and denominator ν(e<t ‖ a<t) · Γt. In contrast to the iterative value func-
tion, the numerator is now nondecreasing in m because we assumed rewards
to be nonnegative (Assumption 3b). Hence both numerator and denominator
are lower semicomputable functions, so Lemma 2 (iv) implies that W ∗ν is ∆
0
2-
computable.
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Now we can apply our results from Section 3.2 to show that using the re-
cursive value function Wπν , we get a universal AI model with an infinite horizon
whose ε-approximation is limit computable. Moreover, in contrast to iterative
AINU, recursive AINU actually maximizes ν-expected rewards.
Corollary 22 (Complexity of Recursive AINU/AIXI). For any environment
ν ∈ M, recursive AINU is ∆03 and there is an ε-optimal recursive AINU that is
∆02. In particular, for any universal Turing machine, recursive AIXI is ∆
0
3 and
there is an ε-optimal recursive AIXI that is limit computable.
Proof. From Theorem 8, Theorem 11, and Lemma 21.
Analogously to Theorem 14, Theorem 16, and Theorem 17 we can show that
recursive AIXI is not computable, recursive AINU is Π02-hard, and for some
universal Turing machines, ε-optimal recursive AIXI is Σ01-hard.
5 Discussion
We set out with the goal of finding a limit-computable perfect agent. Table 3 on
page 8 summarizes our computability results regarding Solomonoff’s prior M :
conditional M and Mnorm are limit computable, while M and Mnorm are not.
Table 1 on page 3 summarizes our computability results for AINU, AIXI, and
AINU: iterative AINU with finite lifetime is ∆03. Having an infinite horizon in-
creases the level by one, while restricting to ε-optimal policies decreases the level
by one. All versions of AINU are situated between ∆02 and ∆
0
4 (Corollary 9 and
Corollary 12). For environments that almost surely continue forever (semimea-
sure that are measures), AIMU is limit-computable and ε-optimal AIMU is
computable. We proved that these computability bounds on iterative AINU
are generally unimprovable (Theorem 15 and Theorem 16). Additionally, we
proved weaker lower bounds for AIXI independent of the universal Turing ma-
chine (Theorem 14) and for ε-optimal AIXI for specific choices of the universal
Turing machine (Theorem 17 and Theorem 18).
We considered ε-optimality in order to avoid having to break argmax ties.
This ε does not have to be constant over time, instead we may let ε → 0
as t → ∞ at any computable rate. With this we retain the computability
results of ε-optimal policies and get that the value of the ε(t)-optimal policy
π
ε(t)
ν converges rapidly to the ν-optimal value: V ∗ν (æ<t) − V π
ε(t)
ν
ν (æ<t) → 0 as
t→∞. Therefore the limitation to ε-optimal policies is not very restrictive.
When the environment ν has nonzero probability of not producing a new
percept, the iterative definition (Definition 4) of AINU fails to maximize ν-
expected rewards (Proposition 19). We introduced a recursive definition of the
value function for infinite horizons (Definition 20), which correctly returns ν-
expected value. The difference between the iterative value function V and re-
cursive value function W is readily exposed in the difference between M and
M . Just like V conditions on surviving forever, so does M eliminate the weight
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of programs that do not produce infinite strings. Both M and V are not limit
computable for this reason.
Our main motivation for the introduction of the recursive value function W
is the improvement of the computability of optimal policies. Recursive AINU
is ∆03 and admits a limit-computable ε-optimal policy (Corollary 22). In this
sense our goal to find a limit-computable perfect agent has been accomplished.
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